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Cyber Operations and The Humanization of
International Humanitarian Law: Problems and
Prospects
Giacomo Biggio*
The aim of International Humanitarian Law (‘‘IHL”) is to regulate the
conduct of hostilities while, at the same time, balancing the two overarching
concepts of military necessity and humanity. While the principle of military
necessity allows a party to a conflict to exercise any amount of armed violence
which is necessary for the accomplishment of a military purpose, the principle of
humanity aims at minimizing the amount of physical violence caused to
combatants and the civilian population. From the late 19th century onwards
the principle of humanity has progressively eroded the domain of military
necessity, influencing the creation and interpretation of IHL, in a process which
is referred to as the ‘‘humanization” of IHL1. A key area of IHL in which such
process has taken place is the law of targeting, whose aim is to limit ‘‘attacks” 2,
by prohibiting belligerents to direct them against civilians. In this context, the
rise of cyber warfare capabilities establishes a tension between the violencecentered rationale of the law of targeting and the nature of cyber attacks, as their
effects may have devastating consequences even without causing any form of
physical violence.3 What kind of cyber operations should qualify as ‘attacks’
under the law of targeting? The answer to this question can reconfigure the
delicate balance between military necessity and humanity, raising implications
for the protection of the civilian population and the humanitarian aims of IHL.
My contribution offers a critical evaluation of the relationship between the
principle of humanity within the law of targeting and cyber warfare, and
proposes a ‘‘human security” paradigm for the regulation of cyber attacks in
armed conflict.

I. INTRODUCTION
The term ‘‘humanization of warfare”4 denotes a process in which humanityoriented considerations influence the creation and interpretation of the rules of
*
1
2

3

4

PhD Candidate, University of Sheffield.
Meron, T., ‘‘The Humanization of Humanitarian Law” (2000) 94 Am J Intl L 239-278.
An attack is ‘‘an act of violence against the adversary, whether in offer or defense”:
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the
Protections of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977, Art.
49 (1).
Consider, for instance, a cyber operation that targets the stock market of a state or one
that shuts down an electrical power grid of a city.
Meron, supra note 1. See also Kjetil Mujezinovi Larsen, Camilla Guldahl Cooper & Gro
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International Humanitarian Law (IHL). This process, which is the reflection of a
trend that embraces the whole spectrum of international law,5 manifests itself in
different areas of IHL, from the rules aimed at improving the conditions of
Prisoners of War, medical and religious personnel deployed in the battlefield to
those designed to enhance the protection of the civilian population and civilian
objects. With regard to the latter aspect, humanitarian considerations play a
fundamental role in the law of targeting, a segment of the jus in bello consisting in
the rules of distinction, proportionality and precaution, whose primary purpose
is to regulate ‘‘attacks”, a concept defined under Art. 49 of the First Additional
Protocol to the Geneva Conventions (AP I) as ‘‘acts of violence against the
adversary, whether in offence or in defence.”6 Once an act qualifies as an attack,
the principle of distinction requires combatants to direct their attacks against
military objectives, and forbids attacks against civilians7 — individuals who are
not directly participating in hostilities by performing or participating in the
planning of attacks8; the principle of proportionality prohibits indiscriminate
attacks, that is, attacks that cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians,
damage or destruction to objects, or a combination thereof, which would be
excessive in relation to the military advantage expected from the operation. 9
Lastly, the principle of precaution requires belligerents to take a series of
precautionary measures when launching attacks, such as verifying that a target of
an attack is a military objective,10 suspending or cancelling the attack when the
target is a civilian object or when the attack would be indiscriminate,11 and
taking all feasible precaution in their choice of means and methods of warfare in
order to prevent and minimize the adverse effects of attacks on the civilian
population.12 The rationale that underlies the law of targeting is, therefore, to
limit the amount of violence that the parties to a conflict may lawfully employ
during an armed conflict in order to give civilians the greatest possible degree of

5
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Nytsuen, eds, Searching for a ‘‘Principle of Humanity” in International Humanitarian
Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013).
Ruti G. Teitel, Humanity Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011); Anne Peters,
‘‘Humanity as the A and of Sovereignty” (2009) 20:3 EJIL 545.
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 18 June 1977, 1125
UNTS 3 art 49 (entered into force 7 December 1978) [AP I].
Ibid art. 48.
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 12 August 1949, 75
UNTS 135, art. 3 (entered into force 21 October 1950). See also Nils Melzer, Interpretive
Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under International
Humanitarian Law (May 2009), online: International Committee of the Red Cross
<www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc-002-0990.pdf>.
AP I, supra note 6, art. 51(5)(b).
Ibid art. 57(2)(a)(i).
Ibid art. 57(2)(b).
Ibid art. 58.
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protection. While the law of targeting represents a defining moment in the
humanization of IHL, the rise of cyber warfare and the use of Computer
Network Attacks (CNAs)13 in the midst of hostilities may adversely affect such
process. In fact, the notion of attack — the kernel of the law of targeting — is
premised on the concept of violence, which has been interpreted as a synonym of
physical harm:14 everything that causes injury or death to civilians, or damage or
destruction of objects as its primary effect qualifies as an attack, whereas acts not
causing physical violence are not limited by the rules on distinction,
proportionality and precaution. Beyond physical harm, it must be added that
the notion of violence under AP I includes military harm as well. As correctly
observed by the ICRC, the notion of military harm ‘‘should be interpreted as
encompassing not only the infliction of death, injury, or destruction o[f] military
personnel and objects, but essentially any consequence adversely affecting the
military operations or military capacity of a party to a conflict”, such as acts of
‘‘sabotage and other armed or unarmed activities restricting or disturbing
deployments, logistics and communications.”15
CNAs are, on the one hand, clearly capable of causing violent consequences:
incidents such as the Stuxnet worm attack, which targeted the centrifuges of the
Iranian nuclear facility of Natanz, causing the destruction of physical
components of the nuclear plant and the release of radioactive materials in the
surrounding environment, demonstrate how the causation of physical violence is
well within the reach of cyber warfare. The same holds true for the causation of
military harm, as a computer network attack can interfere with the Supervisory
Control and Data Acquisition System (SCADA system) of any modern weapon
system.
To this extent, the humanity-inspired rules on targeting can be easily
interpreted to govern cyber attacks taking place in an armed conflict. On the
other hand, CNAs may cause no physical violence at all, yet can have serious
consequences: the paradigmatic example is a concerted cyber attack against the
banking system of a State, aimed at causing a financial collapse. It is no doubt
that, even if no death or destruction would occur, the target State would be on
the brink of collapse: the consequences of such an attack, as it will be
demonstrated in the course of the article, represent a new form of violence, even
if non-physical in nature.
13

14

15

A cyber attack or Computer Network Attack is defined by the US Joints Chief of Staff as
an operation designed to ‘‘disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy information resident in the
target information system or networks, or the systems/ networks themselves”: James E.
Cartwright, Memorandum for Chiefs of the Military Services Commanders, Commanders
of the Combatant Commands, Directors of the Joint Staff Directorates, at 3, online:
<www.nsci-va.org/cyberreferencelib/2010-11-joint%20terminology%20for%20cyberspace%20operations.pdf>.
Michael N. Schmitt, ‘‘Wired Warfare: Computer Network Attack and Jus in Bello”
(2002) 84:846 Intl Rev Red Cross 365 at 377.
Melzer, supra note 8 at 47-48.
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The extent to which the notion of ‘‘attack” should be applied to non-physical
violent cyber operations can dramatically impact upon the humanization of
warfare. Should a non-physical violent CNA be considered as not falling within
the definition of ‘‘attack” under Art. 49 AP I, then the law of targeting would not
apply, and the parties to the conflict would be free to launch this kind cyber
operations without legal scrutiny.
The purpose of this article is to present a convincing case for the application
of the rules of targeting to non-physical violent CNAs. In order to do so, the
article will address and critique the main interpretive approaches to the notion of
cyber attack in the jus in bello regime, then propose an alternative approach,
based on human-security oriented concerns, to the notion of cyber attack.

II. THE TALLINN MANUAL INTERPRETATION OF CYBER ATTACK:
PROBLEMS AND CRITIQUES
The most authoritative effort to apply Art. 49 AP I to cyber attacks comes
from the Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare
(‘‘Tallinn Manual”), which represents the collective effort of a Group of Experst
(GoE) convened on behalf of NATO with the task of clarifying the applicability
of the jus in bello and the jus ad bellum to cyber warfare. A cyber attack is
defined, under rule 30 of the Tallinn Manual, as a ‘‘cyber operation, whether
offensive or defensive, that is reasonably expected to cause injury or death to
persons or damage or destruction to objects”.16
The Tallinn Manual’s approach analogizes the effects of cyber attacks to
those caused by kinetic weapons, in what has been referred to as the ‘‘kinetic
equivalence effects test” (KEE Test),17 to the extent that a cyber attack causes
physical violence in the form of injury to individuals or damage to objects, it is an
attack for the purposes of IHL. Conversely, the accompanying commentary
notes that ‘‘non-violent operations, such as psychological cyber operations or
cyber espionage, do not qualify” as such.18
On the one hand, the KEE Test has the merit of being easily applicable to
some clear-cut cases of highly-destructives cyber attacks. On the other hand, its
limits appear evident when it comes to classifying the nature of cyber operations
that do not fall into higher extremity of the causation of physical violence (such
as cyber attack causing a plane to crash) or at its opposite (as in the case of an
operation of data exfiltration). Secondly, under the KEE Test, the classification
of cyber operations that interfere with the functionality of an object remains
16

17

18

Michael N. Schmitt, ed., Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber
Warfare (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013) at 106 [Schmitt, Tallinn
Manual].
Karine Bannelier-Christakis, ‘‘Is the principle of distinction still relevant in cyberwarfare?” in Nocholas Tsagourias and Russell Buchan, eds., Research Handbook on
International Law and Cyberspace (Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2015) 343 at 348.
Schmitt, Tallinn Manual, supra note 16 at 106.
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unclear. Consider, for instance, a CNA that shuts down the electrical power grid
of a city. Albeit the Tallinn Manual excludes the possibility that such an
operation may fall under the meaning of ‘‘cyber attack”, it has specified that the
threshold for the qualification requires ‘‘physical replacement of the
components” of the systems whose functionality has been impaired or
compromised. Should the cyber operation on the electrical power grid require
physical replacement of some of its components, that alone should qualify the
cyber operation as an attack.
Vice versa, a cyber operation that requires mere digital data restoration does
not qualify as an attack according to the majority of the GoE,19 even in the
presence of other grave consequences (such as massive financial losses). Under
the Tallinn Manual definition, these operations would not qualify as attacks as
the threshold of physical violence would not be met. The reason behind this
approach lies in the fact that the Tallinn Manual interprets digital data as an
immaterial entity, something which differs from an ‘‘object” because it is not
‘‘visible and tangible”, as noted by the ICRC Commentary on the Additional
Protocols.20 It follows that, if data is not an object, then a cyber attack that
merely alters or deletes digital data does not cause ‘‘damage” or ‘‘destruction” to
objects, and no physical violence occurs. This leads to a further consideration:
what if a cyber attack interferes with digital data stored in the system of a
military objective (for instance, an operation that disables the SCADA system of
anti-aircraft artillery) in a way that does not require physical replacement? In
such a case, it could well be argued that the operation would adversely affect the
military capacity of one of the parties to an armed conflict. However, under the
Tallinn Manual approach, it is debatable whether such an operation would
qualify as an attack.
Against the Tallinn Manual interpretation several counter-arguments have
been put forward. Nils Melzer suggests that what is relevant for the application
of the rules of distinction, proportionality and precaution is the concept of
‘‘military operation” and not the notion of ‘‘attack”.21 Military operations are
defined by Art. 48 and 51 of AP I as ‘‘all movement and acts related to hostilities
that are undertaken by armed forces.”22 Hence, even a cyber operation that
causes non-physical violent consequences and would not, under the Tallinn
Manual interpretation, qualify as an attack, would nonetheless fall within the
broader notion of military operations and would have to comply with the law of
targeting. While this interpretation has the merit of circumventing the
19
20

21

22

Ibid at 108-109.
Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski & Bruno Zimmerman, eds., Commentary to the
Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (Geneva:
International Committee of the Red Cross, 1987) at paras 2007-2008.
Nils Melzer, Cyberwarfare and International Law (2011) at 27 online: United Nations
Institute for Disarmament Research <unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/cyberwarfareand-international-law-382.pdf>.
Sandoz, supra note 20 at para 1875.
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interpretive problems associated with the definition of ‘‘attack” in the cyber
context, it does not stand against a systematic reading of Part IV of AP I, which
deals with the protection of civilians and civilian objects: as Roscini points out,
the ICRC commentary clarifies that section IV applies only to attacks, that is, to
‘‘military operations during which violence is used.”23 Furthermore, AP I
operates a distinction between attacks and military operations with regards to
the obligation that belligerents have to comply with in order to protect the
civilian population and objects: while attacks are limited by the principle of
distinction, military operations are merely subject to the more generic obligation
to take constant care. The proposed interpretation is therefore untenable.
A different view has been put forward by Dormann, who argues that what
makes an act an ‘‘attack” does not include mere destruction of objects, but also
other modalities of interaction, namely capture and neutralization, as suggested
by the definition of ‘‘military objective” under Art 52 (2) of AP I.24 More
specifically, the definition of ‘‘neutralization” appears to suit the reality of cyber
operations, since it was included to signify ‘‘an attack for the purpose of denying
the use of an object to the enemy without necessarily destroying it.”25 The main
weakness of this approach is that it relies on the notion of military objective to
define what is an ‘‘attack”. However, the definition of military objective implies
the existence of an attack in the first place, a notion which is already defined in
the Protocol and which, as it has been discussed above, is dependent upon the
causation of physical violence. On the other hand, the concepts of ‘‘capture and
neutralization” do not operate as qualifiers of an attack: instead, they are just
descriptions of what is the objective of an attack launched against a military
objective, in the sense that an attack can only cause not only the destruction of a
military objective, but also to its capture or neutralization. The interpretation but
forward by Dormann, being limited to an examination of military objectives, can
be traced back the rationale that a cyber operation causing military harm — that
is, affecting the military capacity of the adversary — by neutralizing an object
would constitute an attack. However, it does not explain whether cyber
operations directed against civilian objects, and which do not result in physical
violent consequences, should be qualified as attacks or not.

23

24

25

Marco Roscini, Cyber Operations and the Use of Force in International Law (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2014) at 178.
Knut Dormann, Applicability of the Additional Protocols to Computer Network Attacks
(2004) at 6, online: International Committee of the Red Cross <https://www.icrc.org/
eng/assets/files/other/applicabilityofihltocna.pdf>.
Michael Bothe, Karl Josel Partsch & Waldemar A. Solf, New Rules for Victims of Armed
Conflicts (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1982) at 325.
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III. THE EVOLUTIVE INTERPRETATION OF THE NOTION OF
“VIOLENCE” WITHIN THE DEFINITION OF ‘‘ATTACK”
While the former approaches focused on aspects external to the notion of
attack, namely the definition of military operation and the modalities of
interaction with military objectives, several other authors have proposed an
‘‘evolutionary” or ‘‘dynamic’ interpretation of the notion of attack and the
underlying concept of violence.26 Evolutionary interpretation is a tool used to
clarify the meaning of terms within a treaty, and it is premised on the assumption
that the ordinary meaning of a certain term can evolve over time. An explanation
of this interpretive technique is found in the Navigation Rights case before the
ICJ, where the court held that if the parties choose a generic term in a treaty
entered into force for a very long time, they should be presumed to have intended
for such a term an evolving meaning.27
While the Navigations Rights case proves its usefulness in explaining the
evolutionary interpretation principle, other pronouncements by the ICJ offer
practical examples of the application of such approach. The most relevant one is
to be found in the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use
of Nuclear Weapons. Faced with the question whether, absent any express treaty
provision that banned the use of nuclear weapons, their use should have been
considered lawful under IHL, the court argued that excluding nuclear weapons
for the application of the principles of IHL ‘‘would be incompatible with the
intrinsically humanitarian character of the legal principles in question which
permeates the entire law of armed conflict and applies to [. . .] all kinds of
weapons, those of the past, those of the present and those of the future.” 28 The
argument of the court, while related to the more generic issue of the applicability
of IHL to a certain weapon technology, is however an unquestionable example of
evolutive interpretation of the law. As a further example, in the GabcikovoNagymaros case, the ICJ considered that the terms of the bilateral agreement
between Czechoslovakia and Hungary should be interpreted taking into
consideration the law and scientific knowledge as they evolved at the time the
case was decided before the court and not at the time the treaty was concluded. 29
A dynamic approach has been, finally, endorsed by other international courts,
such as the European and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, which
interpret human rights treaties as ‘‘living instruments”.30
26

27

28

29
30

Bannerlier-Christakis, supra note 17 at 354-355; Kubo Maák, ‘‘Military Objectives 2.0:
The Case for Interpreting Computer Data as Objects under International Humanitarian
Law” (2015) 48:1 Israel LR 55 at 68.
Dispute Regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v Nicaragua), [2009] ICJ
Rep 213 at para 66.
Legality of the Threat and Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion [1996] ICJ Rep 226
at para 86.
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v Slovakia), [1997] ICJ Rep 7 at para.140.
Maák, supra note 26 at 73.
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Assuming that the evolutionary interpretation represents a useful tool for
understanding the notion of violence in the present day, the main question then
revolves around what elements, within the notion of violence, need to be reinterpreted.
According to this strand of the doctrine, the main issue revolves around the
interpretation given by the Tallinn Manual to digital data as an immaterial
entity.31 Thus, Maák points out that digital data may, in fact, qualify as an
‘‘object” under IHL, since the drafters of the Protocols interpreted objects as
being ‘‘tangible and visible” in opposition to abstract concepts, such as ‘‘the
general objective [. . .] of a military operation.” 32 The reason behind such
distinction is apparent if one considers that ‘‘[i]f a party’s aim amounted to a
legitimate target justifying an attack by its opponent, the detailed and balanced
rules on targeting would lose any sense.”33 Following this logic, if digital data is
an object, an act that results in damage or destruction with digital data would
amount to an attack.
In light of these considerations, the view according to which cyber operations
that target digital data fall within the same category as psychological operations
cannot be shared. As Lubell suggests, the aim of psychological operation consists
in persuading a certain target, be it the military or the civilian population, by
influencing its morale. On the other hand, cyber attacks are ‘‘more often
designed with some form of harmful effect in mind [. . .] even if not always
measurable in casualties.”34
In conclusion, the dynamic approach focuses primarily on the inclusion,
within the concept of ‘‘object”, of digital data. If digital data is an object that can
be attacked, then it follows that interference with digital data, either in the form
of destruction or alteration, falls within the meaning of physical violence.
According to this view, a cyber operation that interferes with the functionality of
a military objective by targeting its digital data shall be considered an attack,
since it adversely affects the military capacity of the belligerent by causing
military harm. While the inclusion of this kind of cyber operations within Art. 49
AP I is a step forward compared to the Tallinn Manual’s approach, some
authors have pointed out that the dynamic interpretation of the notion of attack
is too extensive.35 In fact, if a cyber attack is an operation that deletes, alters or in
any other way interferes with digital data, then any cyber operation would
qualify as an attack under IHL, be it an operation of data exfiltration from a
governmental website or a cyber attack aimed at shutting down an electrical
power grid. Moreover, participation in hostilities would be determined by the
31

32
33
34
35

Ibid at 70; Noam Lubell, ‘‘Lawful Targets in Cyber Operations: Does the Principle of
Distinction Apply?” (2013) 89 Intl L Studies 252 at 267.
Maák, supra note 26 at 60.
Ibid.
Lubell, supra note 31 at 263-264.
Cordula Droege, ‘‘Get off My Cloud” (2012) 94:886 Intl Rev Red Cross 533 at 558-559.
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performance of any of such acts. Such a legal outcome, therefore, cannot be
agreed upon because it would put too many restraints on the conduct of
hostilities and it would likely be disregarded by the parties to a conflict, leading
to non-compliance with the rules of targeting and would have an adverse impact
on the humanization of IHL. For these reasons, the dynamic approach does not
represent a viable alternative to the Tallinn Manual’s interpretation.

IV. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EFFECTS OF CYBER ATTACKS
AND THE NOTION OF VIOLENCE: A HUMAN SECURITY-BASED
PARADIGM
A proper humanity-oriented interpretation of the notion of attack should
focus on the relationship between the nature of the effects caused by cyber
attacks and the rationale behind the qualification of an act as an attack.
Conventional attacks, as well as cyber attacks, can have different effects in
terms of their causal proximity to the act that has produced them. In this regard,
a distinction must be made between first and second-order effects. First order
effects are those which are directly consequential to an attack. In the case of a
conventional attack, the first order consequences always result in the causation
of death or injury to individuals or destruction of objects, as in the case of an air
strike that destroys an ammunition factory. With regards to cyber attacks, their
first order effects always result in the interaction between the cyber operation
and its target, that is, digital data stored in a computer system or a network. As
an example, the first-order effects of a cyber operation directed against an
electrical power grid stem from the interaction between the cyber attack and the
digital data within the operating system of the electrical grid. In this regard, a
cyber operation that interferes with digital data may qualify as an attack only
when it is directed against a military objective, since it would adversely affect the
military capacity of a belligerent by inflicting military harm. However, when such
a cyber operation is directed towards a civilian object, mere destruction or
interference with digital data alone does not result in the infliction of physical
violence, and therefore is not sufficient for the qualification of a cyber operation
as an attack. What qualifies a cyber operation as an attack is the evaluation of its
second-order effects, which can be described as the consequences of the firstorder effects. Second-order effects can result in physical violence: for instance,
considering the above example, the loss of electricity resulting from shutting
down the power grid may cause a fire which can cause death or injury to
civilians, or damage or destruction to civilian objects. Moreover, non-physical
second-order consequences may also take place, as shutting down a grid which
provides electricity for a town would deprive the civilian population of a basic
service and would likely generate panic. As already noted, the Tallinn Manual
recognizes that, as long as second-order effects cause physical violence, then the
cyber operation that produced them is an attack, as evidenced by rule 30,
according to which:

50
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The word ‘‘cause” [. . .] is not limited to effects on the targeted cyber
system. Rather, it encompasses any reasonably foreseeable consequential damage, destruction, injury, or death. Cyber-attacks seldom involve
the release of direct physical force against the targeted cyber system;
yet, they can result in great harm to individuals or objects. For
example, the release of dam waters by manipulating a SCADA system
would cause massive downstream destruction without damaging the
system. Were this operation to be conducted using kinetic means, like
bombing the dam, there is no question that it would be regarded as an
attack. No rationale exists for arriving at a different conclusion in the
cyber context.36

Therefore, second-order non-physical consequences are not considered
violence under the Tallinn Manual approach, regardless of their adverse effects
on the target State or the civilian population.
In this regard, it is submitted that there should be an interpretive shift in the
rationale behind the prohibition on attacks, which is premised on the protection
of State Security oriented interests, with values influenced by the notion of
Human Security. The concept of ‘‘human security”, first introduced in the UN
Human Development Report 1994,37 is an emerging practice that aims at
integrating the traditional notion of State Security, focused on the protection of
the territorial integrity of a State against external aggression, with an approach
focused on securing of essential human needs, such as environmental security,
economic security, health and food security and political security among
others.38 The adoption of a human security based paradigm for the definition of
cyber attacks under the jus in bello would allow to conceive the notion of violence
as including not only second-order physical violent consequences, but also
second-order non-physical consequences that have an adverse impact on Human
Security protected needs. The focus on basic human needs is an element which is
also present in several specific provisions of AP I that take into account secondorder consequences that are different from physical violence. For instance, Art.
51(2) prohibits attacks aimed at spreading terror among the civilian
population:39 the notion of terror denotes a form of severe psychological
suffering that is certainly different from the notion of ‘‘injury”. Similarly, Art. 55
protects the natural environment against ‘‘widespread, long-term and severe
damage”40: while the notion of ‘‘damage” includes destruction of parts of the
36
37

38

39

Schmitt, Tallinn Manual, supra note 16 at 107.
Human Development Report 1994 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), online:
United Nations Development Programme >.
Martin Wählisch, ‘‘Human Security: Concept and Evolution in the United Nations‘‘ in
Frauke Lachenmann, Tilmann J. R—der & Rüdiger Wolfrum, eds, Max Planck
Yearbook of United Nations Law (Boston: Brill Nijhoff, 2014) 3 at 18; Matthew S.
Weinert, ‘‘From State Security to Human Security?‘‘ in Patrick Hayden, ed., The Ashgate
Research Companion to Ethics and International Relations (Routledge, 2009) 151.
AP I, supra note 6, art 51 (2).
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environment, it can also encompass other forms of alteration of the natural
environment which cause environmental harm, such as massive oil or radioactive
materials spills. Finally, Art. 54 prohibits to ‘‘attack, destroy, remove or render
useless objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population” 41: in this
case, the damage suffered from the civilian population from an attack targeting
‘‘objects indispensable” to their survival cannot be understood as being
equivalent to ‘‘death” or ‘‘injury” but, rather, is more akin to a form of
deprivation that severely affects its health and its well-being. It can be argued
that IHL is concerned with the regulation of second-order effects where they do
not appear to cause physical harm in the form of death or injury to individuals or
material damage or destruction to objects. The reason of this statement lies in the
fact that the second-order consequences listed under Arts. 51(2), 55 and 56 AP I
are capable to endanger values protected by IHL and which are, at the same
time, falling under the wider concept of human security, such as the safety of
environment, the health of the civilian population and its psychological wellbeing: in these circumstances, these second-order effects can be qualified as a
form of non-physical violence. Against these considerations, it can be noted that
what triggers the application of these provisions is the existence of an attack that
causes first-order physical violent consequences. Therefore, in the case of a CNA
that would not cause any death or injury to individuals, or damage or destruction
to objects, Articles 51 (2), 54 and 56 would have no reason to apply. However, it
is unreasonable to exclude from the definition of attack a cyber operation whose
first-order effects consist in mere interference with digital data, but whose
second-order effects would cause non-physical violent consequences that would
adversely affect the security of a state in the same way as physical violent
consequences would. Rather, such a cyber operation should be regarded as an
‘‘attack” under IHL: under this approach, a cyber operation aimed at spreading
terror against the civilian population would fall under the meaning of Art. 51(2),
whereas one that deactivates the control system of an oil plant resulting in
massive oil spills would be prohibited by Art. 56.
The above interpretation expands the notion of violence to non-physical
consequences that, by endangering values that are protected by IHL, adversely
affect the security of humans. This consideration begs the question of whether
cyber operations whose consequences would severely affect human securityrelated values which are not explicitly protected by the provisions of AP I should
be considered new forms of ‘‘attacks” under IHL. The answer is in the
affirmative.
Consider again the scenario in which a CNA targets the stock market of the
victim state by interfering with the digital data stored within the system operating
the stock market, the CNA would cause second-order consequences resulting in
massive currency manipulation leading to deflation, and the freezing of hundreds
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of thousands of bank accounts. The kind of consequences will not be physically
violent in nature, however their outcome would result in widespread
unemployment, severe distress among the civilian population, and would be
considered as a threat to the economic and financial stability of the target State.
Under this scenario, the second-order effects of the attack would be extremely
serious, causing economic harm by depriving the civilian population of the
possibility to withdraw currency. This kind of consequences should be qualified,
as they endanger human security-related values, as a form of non-physical
violence and the cyber operation that caused them should be considered as an
attack within the meaning of Art. 49 AP I.
In order to determine with greater certainty whether a cyber operation is
intended to cause second non-physical consequences that may threaten essential
human needs, it is useful to examine the notion of Critical National
Infrastructure (‘‘CNI”). Albeit there is no accepted definition of CNI under
international law, different states have defined the term in a similar manner. For
instance, the US Joint Terminology for Cyberspace defines them as ‘‘[s]ystems
and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital that the incapacity or destruction
of such may have a debilitating impact on security, economy, public health or
safety, environment, or any combination of these matters, across any Federal,
State, regional, territorial, or local jurisdiction.”42 The German definition is also
similarly worded, since it includes ‘‘organizations or institutions with major
importance for the public good, whose failure or damage would lead to
sustainable supply bottlenecks, considerable disturbance of public security or
other dramatic consequences.”43 The European Commission also defines the
notion of European Critical Infrastructure as ‘‘an asset, system or part thereof
located in Member States which is essential for the maintenance of vital societal
functions, health, safety, security, economic or social well-being of people, and
the disruption or destruction of which would have a significant impact in a
Member State as a result of the failure to maintain those functions.” 44
In this regard, it must be noted that the definitions of CNI, whether at State
or regional level, represent a perfect combination between the notion of State
Security and Human Security, since the destruction or disruption of the functions
of a CNI would affect several services of vital importance such as energy, food,
water, transportation, banking, communication, financial and governmental
sectors.45 It can therefore be assumed that a cyber operation that disables,
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temporarily or permanently, the functionality of a CNI would cause
consequences that would adversely affect Human Security related needs.
For these reasons, it is submitted that the definition of attack in the cyber
context should be interpreted as including the following categories. Firstly, there
are cyber operations whose second-order consequences are intended to cause
death, injury to civilians, destruction or damage to objects; these cyber
operations qualify as attacks because they cause physical violence. Secondly,
cyber operations which cause mere interference with digital data would also
qualify as an attack if they are intended to adversely affect the military capacity
of one of the belligerents, thereby causing military harm.
The last category includes cyber operations that cause non-physical violence,
namely, cyber operations that are intended to cause psychological harm,
environmental harm, those which deprive the civilian population of objects
necessary for its survival, and any other cyber operation which adversely impacts
human-security protected values, such as CNAs that are intended to interfere
with the functionality of a CNI.
In conclusion, this article has shown how different interpretations of the
concept of cyber attack may have an impact on the humanization of IHL.
Discussing the prevalent approaches in the doctrine, it demonstrated how they
would adversely affect the humanization process. It has, then, proposed an
alternative view that consisted on incorporating human security related
considerations in the concept of violence, upon which the definition of attack
under Art. 49 AP I is based. By doing so, the principle of humanity can continue
to play an important role in the cyber scenario, requiring belligerents to comply
with the rules on distinction, proportionality and precaution when launching
CNAs, and, therefore, increasing the protection of the civilian population from
their effects.

World, (November 2011) at 9, online: < www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/
uploads/attachment_data/file/60961/uk-cyber-security-strategy-final.pdf>.

